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We develop a two-country, two-sector general equilibrium business cycle model
with nominal rigidities featuring deviations from the law of one price. The paper
shows that a model with these features can quantitatively account for the empir-
ical fact that of the statistical properties of most macroeconomic variables, only
the volatility of the real and nominal exchange rates has dramatically changed
after the fall of the Bretton Woods system. In particular, we replicate some ex-
plicit non-structural tests proposed in the literature with simulated data from our
artiﬁcial economy. We ﬁnd that while the variability of observed fundamentals
(e.g., output, money supply, and interest rates) is barely aﬀected by the exchange
rate regime, that of the exchange rate increases substantially under ﬂexible rates.
Keywords: equilibrium business cycle, price-adjustment costs, pricing to mar-
ket, exchange rate regime, exchange rate volatility, and fundamentals.
21. Introduction
The main industrial countries have experienced a wide range of exchange rate
arrangements in the last two centuries, ranging between the two polar systems
of ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rates. The same variety of exchange rate regimes
we observe across time for an individual country also exists today across coun-
tries. A natural question arises: what are the eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange rate
arrangements on aggregate ﬂuctuations and on the international transmission of
real and monetary disturbances?
Exchange rate regimes have non-neutral eﬀects. It is a well-established fact in
international ﬁnance, documented by Stockman (1983) and Mussa (1986), among
others, that the type of exchange rate regime aﬀects the behavior of the real
exchange rate: the latter is much more variable under the current managed ﬂoat
than it was under Bretton Woods. The empirical evidence also shows that since
1973, the wild movements in nominal and real exchange rates have been highly
correlated while ratios of price indices have been rather stable. Many economists
view this as evidence that price rigidities matter and that they should be one of
the basic ingredients in any theory of international economic ﬂuctuations.1
However, as pointed out by Baxter and Stockman (1989), the statistical prop-
erties of most other macroeconomic variables have remained very similar under
the current managed ﬂoat to what they were under Bretton Woods. More re-
cently, Sopraseuth (1999) ﬁnds similar results for both the Bretton Woods and
the European Rate Mechanism era.2 This fact poses a serious challenge to any
economic model, with or without nominal rigidities, in which relative prices (like
the real exchange rate) play a critical role in the allocation of real quantities.
One would ap r i o r iexpect that a more volatile real exchange rate would be as-
sociated with an increase in the volatility of other macoeconomic series. In this
vein, Flood and Rose (1995), having shown that the change in the volatility of
the nominal exchange rate across exchange rate systems has no counterpart in
that of any “traditional” fundamental, argue that this “suggests that exchange
rate models based only on macroeconomic fundamentals are unlikely to be very
successful.”
In this paper we quantitatively analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes on business cycle properties in a two-country, two-sector, dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model in which prices are sluggish in responding to shocks, as
1Stockman (1983) argues that equilibrium models with no price rigidity may account for the
non-neutrality of the exchange rate regime as well.
2Sopraseuth, moreover, uses bootstrap techniques to measure the accuracy of the given statis-
tics of interest.
3some ﬁrms face price-adjustment costs. We introduce deviations from purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) that arise from a failure of the law of one price (LOP),
postulating that some ﬁrms in both countries are able to price discriminate be-
tween markets. This imperfect pass-through in consumer prices, as pointed out
by Devereux (1997) and Betts and Devereux (1998), diminishes the eﬀect of ex-
change rate changes on equilibrium allocations, making our model potentially
capable of accounting for the above stylized facts. In our model, we ﬁnd that
the real exchange rate is clearly the variable most aﬀected by the exchange rate
regime. The variability of the real exchange rate falls dramatically under a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime relative to that when the exchange rate ﬂoats. On the other
hand, the volatility of most other variables is practically unchanged across the
two regimes. Our model, however, falls short of replicating the volatility and
persistence displayed by the real exchange rate in the ﬂoating rate period.
To better quantitatively assess whether the relative volatilities of the main
macroeconomic series of our model are aﬀected by the change in the exchange
rate arrangement, we replicate the experiment conducted by Flood and Rose
(1995) with the simulated data from our model economy. We ﬁnd that, as in
their empirical test, the variability of observed fundamentals (e.g., output, money
supply, and interest rates) is barely aﬀected by the exchange rate regime while
that of the exchange rate increases substantially under the ﬂexible exchange rate
regime.
This paper complements recent research exploring the persistence and volatil-
ity of both nominal and real exchange rates in dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium models with nominal rigidities, e.g. Chari et al. (1998) and Kollman (1997).
While these previous papers focus more on the exchange rate properties under
ﬂoating rates, we direct our attention to the eﬀects of diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes on the properties of exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables.
In a vein close to ours, Monacelli (1998) accounts for the increase in the variabil-
ity of the real exchange rate under the current managed ﬂoat, in a (semi)small
open economy with nominal rigidities; nevertheless, he could not account for
the Baxter and Stockman (1989) ﬁndings. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998)
and Devereux and Engle (1998) study the impact of the exchange rate regime on
macroeconomic activity looking at the impact of exchange rate risks on trade and
investment in models with imperfect pass-through. Finally, Moran (1998) studies
the welfare consequence of establishing a monetary union in a model similar to
ours.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the structure
of the model; we then go on to discuss the model’s calibration procedure. The
results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
42. The Model
Building from the work of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995), we model a two-country
w o r l di nw h i c he a c he c o n o m yi sc o m p o s e do ft w os e c t o r s :o n es e c t o rp r o d u c e sa
homogeneous good and the other sector produces a set of diﬀerentiated products.3
Speciﬁcally, the diﬀerentiated goods sector comprises a continuum of monopolis-
tic ﬁrms, each producing a distinct diﬀerentiated good using labor and capital.
These ﬁrms, contrary to the ﬁrms in the competitive sector, face convex price-
adjustment costs of the type analyzed in Hairault and Portier (1993). We assume
that because of barriers to trade, the monopolistic ﬁrms are able to price dis-
criminate across markets. The homogeneous good, which is perfectly traded in
world markets, is also produced using capital and labor. Capital and labor are
mobile across sectors. For simplicity, we assume that investment is carried out
in the homogeneous good only. To generate plausible investment volatility, we
postulate a cost to adjusting the amount of capital in a country, as in Baxter and
Crucini (1993). We now describe the model in more detail.
2.1. Preferences
A representative agent inhabits each economy. The agent maximizes his expected













where4 CT represents the agent’s consumption of the homogeneous good, H rep-
resents the agent’s supply of labor, M
0
denotes the agent’s demand for nominal
money balances, P is the country’s price index, and Cm is an index of consump-









where cm(j) is the agent’s consumption of diﬀerentiated good j,a tt i m et. There
is a continuum of these goods, with measure one. We assume that the home
3The presence of a perfectly competitive sector for which the law of one price holds across
countries is a way to circumvent the indeterminacy in the level of the nominal exchange rate
that may potentially arise in models with PTM and price-adjustment costs.
4I nt h et e x t ,as u p e r s c r i p tp r i m ev a r i a b l ew i l ld e n o t eat i m et +1variable, whereas a vari-
able with no superscript represents a time t variable. Foreign variables will be denoted by an
asterisk. A superscript T represents the purely tradable good, while a superscript m denotes
the imperfectly competitive sector.
5country produces the goods in the interval [0,k], whereas foreign ﬁrms produce
goods in the interval (k,1].
T h ed e m a n df o rt h ed i ﬀerentiated good j, obtained by maximizing the diﬀer-




Pm )−θCm,l = h,f (2.3)
where pm
h,h(j) is the home currency price of the home-produced diﬀerentiated good
(for j ∈[0,k]), pm
h,f(j) is the home currency price of a foreign-produced diﬀeren-




















The production of the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods requires combining
labor and capital using Cobb-Douglas production functions:






0 < γ < 1 (2.5)
ym(j)=A(Km(j))
α (Hm(j))
1−α 0 < α < 1,∀ j (2.6)
where A represents an economy-wide, country-speciﬁc random technology shock.6
Capital accumulation is assumed to be carried out in the homogenous good
only. In any given period, K will represent the capital stock in place in the home
country. To have realistic investment ﬂows (investment volatility tends to be too
high otherwise), we follow Baxter and Crucini (1993) and assume that the law of
motion of capital is subject to adjustment costs. The law of motion is described
by the following equation:
K0 = ψ(I/K)K +( 1− δ)K (2.7)
where δ is the depreciation rate and ψ(.) is an increasing, concave, and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable function with two properties entailing no adjustment
costs in steady state: ψ(δ)=δ and ψ0(δ)=1 .
5The ﬁrst subscript h in p
m
h,l(j) denotes that the good is sold in the home country, while the
second subscript indicates where that good was produced.
6We also examined a version of the model with sector speciﬁcr e a ls h o c k s .T h em a i nﬁndings
of the paper were not aﬀected, however, by this diﬀerent stochastic structure.
62.3. The Firm in the Purely Tradable Good Sector
The ﬁrm’s problem is the usual one:
max






− RTKT − WTHT (2.8)
where PT,R T, and WT denote the nominal price of the purely tradable good,
the rental rate of capital, and the nominal wage rate in the purely tradable good
sector.















2.4. Firms in the Pricing to Market Sector
We assume that ﬁrms in the PTM sector face a price-adjustment cost: when the
firm decides to change the price it sets in the home (foreign) country, it must
purchase an amount µm
h (j)( µm
f (j)) of the homogenous good. The adjustment


















The convex price-adjustment cost could be thought of as being due to customer
loyalty in the presence of imperfect information (Okun (1980)). For instance,
suppose consumers have imperfect information about the distribution of prices
and that this information is costly to acquire. In such an environment, ﬁrms may
prefer to make frequent small price changes rather than sporadic large ones. On
the one hand, a ﬁrm may be unwilling to raise its price by a large amount for
fear of antagonizing consumers and inducing them to search for better price oﬀers
from its competitors. On the other hand, a ﬁrm may also be reluctant to reduce
its price by a large amount in such an environment. The cost for consumers
to look for better prices gives an incentive to the ﬁrm to reduce its price by a
smaller amount than in a world of perfect information. Of course, very little
consensus has been reached on the form of these costs. Carlton (1986) concludes
that there are many instances of small price changes, although a whole spectrum
of pricing behavior is encountered. Kashyap (1995) reaches a similar conclusion
7studying data from retail catalog prices. By having two sectors with diﬀerent
price ﬂexibility, we can capture some aspects of these ﬁndings.7
The (postulated) presence of trade barriers makes it possible for ﬁrms to
price-to-market, by choosing pm
h,h(j), the home-currency price they charge in the
home market, to be diﬀerent from pm
f,h(j), the foreign-currency price they charge
foreign consumers. Speciﬁcally, due to the presence of a price-adjustment cost,
ﬁrms choose prices and inputs to maximize proﬁts solving the following dynamic
programming problem (where we dropped the index j for simplicity):
J(pm
−1h,h,p m
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t−1) denotes the aggregate state of the world
in period t,w i t hg (g∗) denoting the domestic (foreign) growth rate of money
and PDm (PD∗m
t−1) representing the distributions of diﬀerentiated goods’ prices
in the domestic (foreign) economy. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), ρ is
a pricing kernel for contingent claims.
7Woodford (1995) shows that an adjustment-cost model of price rigidity is observationally
equivalent in its implications for the aggregate price level to the Calvo (1983) setup used, for
example, in Kollman (1997).
82.5. The Household
Each period the household decides how much labor to supply to the monopolistic
sector, φH, and to the competitive sector, (1 − φ)H, at the nominal wages Wm
and WT, where 0 < φ < 1. Similarly, the household supplies a fraction, ν,o f
capital to the monopolistic sector and a fraction, (1−ν), to the competitive sector
at the nominal rental rates Rm and RT. In addition to the factor payments, the
wealth of the household comprises the nominal money balances, M, contingent
one-period nominal bonds denominated in the home currency, B(s), which pay
one unit of home currency if state s
0
occurs and 0 otherwise, profits from the
monopolistic ﬁrms,
R k
0 Πm(j)dj, and a governmental lump-sum tax or transfer T.
The household must decide how much of its wealth to allocate to the consumption
of the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods and how much to invest and save
in the form of bonds and nominal money balances, facing the following nominal
budget constraint:














,s) is the price of the bond contingent on the state s
0
occurring at










































The household’s problem can be written as the following dynamic programming
problem:





















subject to (2.21), (2.22), and the law of motion for capital given by (2.7).
2.6. Government
Each period the government makes a lump-sum transfer or collects a lump-sum












where g is a random variable.
2.7. Equilibrium
2.7.1. Deﬁnition
We focus on the equilibrium characterized by symmetry in the monopolistically
competitive sector, deﬁned as follows:
• a set of decision rules for the representative household and the foreign equiv-




(Ω;s), h(Ω;s), I(Ω;s), K0(Ω;s),
ν(Ω;s), and φ(Ω;s), solving the household’s problem;
• a capital demand rule, Km(pm
−1h,h(j),p m
−1f,h(j);s), a labor demand rule
Hm(pm
−1h,h(j),p m







−1f,h(j);s) solving the monopolistic ﬁrm’s problem;
• a capital demand rule, KT(s) a n dal a b o rd e m a n dr u l eHT(s) solving the

























Wm(s),a n dRm(s) are such that the goods, money, bonds, and input mar-
kets clear.









Because some ﬁrms price-discriminate across countries, changes in the real ex-
change rate come from movements in the deviations from the LOP for monopo-
listic goods.
8I no r d e rt os a v eo nn o t a t i o nt h ef o r e i g nc o n d i t i o n sa r en o ts h o w n .































































(ψ(I/K) − ψ0(I/K)(I/K)+( 1− δ)
i
(2.34)
Wm = WT (2.35)
Rm = RT (2.36)
V1(Ω;s)=λ (2.37)
where Ui and Vi represent the partial derivative of the utility function and the
value function with respect to their ith argument, and χ is the multiplier asso-
ciated with the capital evolution equation (2.7). S(s
0
,s) denotes the transition
function governing the state of the world. It gives the probability of state s
0
occurring at time t +1 , given that the world is in state s at time t.
Firms Similarly, the problem of the monopolistic ﬁrm yields the following con-
ditions:













































































where η is the multiplier related to the distribution of output across home and
foreign markets (2.18), and ϕi is the partial derivative of the cost function with
respect to its ith argument.
Conditions (2.38) and (2.39) are the standard conditions stipulating that the
ﬁrm hires labor and capital until the marginal revenue of hiring one more unit
equals its marginal cost. Equations (2.40) and (2.41) indicate that the ﬁrm selects
prices pm
h,h(j) and pm
f,h(j) so that the marginal beneﬁto fr a i s i n gap r i c ee q u a l st h e



































































By raising its price, the monopolistic ﬁrm beneﬁts from the higher value of its
output but bears the current and future costs of changing its price, as well as a
lower current demand for its product.
123. Calibration





















 + υln(1 − H).
The interest elasticity of money demand, σ, is known to be small but positive.
We use Ireland’s (1997) estimate and set it equal to 0.159. υ is calibrated such
that the agent spends 30 percent of his time working in steady state. We set the
share parameter, ω, such that the consumption of diﬀerentiated goods makes up
50 percent of the agent’s total expenditure on consumption in steady state. We
set the discount factor to 0.9901, which implies a quarterly real interest rate of 1
percent.
Production We set θ=6.17. This gives a value of 1.19 for the steady state
markup, which is the value estimated by Morrison (1990). This value is standard
in the literature.












Therefore, there are costs to adjusting prices in steady state as in Ireland (1997).
Following Aiyagari and Braun (1997), we use empirical results from the VAR
literature to calibrate the adjustment cost parameter, d. We choose d such that
the maximal response of employment to a one-standard-deviation impulse to the
growth rate of money is the same as that reported by Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1996). Using a nonstructural VAR in which monetary shocks are
identiﬁed by innovations to nonborrowed reserves, they ﬁnd that a contractionary
one-standard-deviation monetary innovation leads to a 0.149 percent decline in
employment. This yields a value of the adjustment-cost parameter, d,e q u a lt o
6, which implies that, in steady state, the economies spend 0.1% of world output
adjusting prices.
Since all the goods are traded, we used Stockman and Tesar’s (1995) estimate
of the labor share in the production of tradable goods and set (1 − γ) to 0.61.




= λ1+λ2z + ²
0
where z ≡ (z,z∗)
0
, ² ≡ (²,²∗)
0
and λ1 is a vector of constants and λ2 is a matrix
of coeﬀicients. We compute the Solow residuals from aggregate quarterly data
on output and employment for the U.S. and Germany, taken from the Federal
Reserve System database, for the period 1973:1-1998:3 (i.e., the ﬂoating period).
As is standard in the literature, the Solow residuals are constructed as log y-
(1 − 0.39)logn, without including a measure of the capital stock. We used data
on civilian employment instead of hours worked, since Germany does not compile







The standard deviations of the U.S. and German productivity shocks are
0.0037 and 0.0067, respectively, and the correlation between the innovations is
0.028.
Monetary Shocks We assume that the monetary growth rates in the two coun-
tries follow two independent autoregressive processes. We assume independence
because monetary innovations are not highly correlated across countries. We es-
timate the following process for the U.S. and Germany using quarterly data on
M1 for the (ﬂoating) period 1973:1-1998:3
logg
0





is a normally distributed error term with a standard deviation σu. For the
U.S., we obtain the following estimates: ρg =0 .544, g =1 .0142, and σu =0 .007.
In contrast, the estimation on German data yielded ρg =0 .445, g =1 .0189, and
σu =0 .008.
4. Findings
We now assess the business cycle properties of our model economy under the two
diﬀerent exchange rate regimes by studying the eﬀects of both real and monetary
shocks. We begin by computing impulse-response functions to grasp some intu-
ition on the working of our two-sector, two-country model; subsequently, in the
spirit of the equilibrium business cycle literature, we analyze the second moment
14properties of the model, focusing on the diﬀerence in the volatility of key variables
across exchange rate regimes. Finally, we set out to replicate the non-structural
test of Flood and Rose (1995) using simulated data from our artiﬁcial world econ-
omy. Throughout all the exercises but the last one, we deﬁne the ﬁxed exchange
rate regime as the one in which the foreign country (credibly) pegs its currency
to that of the home country.
4.1. Impulse Responses
The impulse-response experiments consist of shocking the driving process once at
date 0, when both countries are at their deterministic steady state. We discuss
first responses of the home and foreign economies to an unexpected increase in
the home growth rate of money (equivalent to a permanent unexpected increase
in the home money stock), followed by an investigation of the responses to an
unexpected positive aggregate real shock to the home country.
Monetary Shock Figures 1a and 1b depict the responses, under each exchange
rate regime, of key variables in each country (aggregate, tradable and PTM out-
put, aggregate consumption, labor supply, relative price of PTM goods, inﬂation,
and the nominal interest rate), as well as the nominal and the real exchange rate,
to a one standard deviation shock to the growth rate of money (amounting to
an increase of 0.6 percentage point). In all ﬁgures, the solid line corresponds to
the peg and the dashed line corresponds to the ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
While the initial shock is unanticipated, the future path of the money stock is
known with certainty by households, because money growth follows a known au-
toregressive law of motion. This means that in our model, monetary policy has
real eﬀects even when anticipated. On impact, because of the presence of the
price-adjustment cost, the home nominal price of monopolistic goods reacts less
than the nominal price of the perfectly competitive good, making the mark up
and relative price of the former fall. As a consequence, households choose to
substitute out of the competitive good into home and foreign PTM goods, since
the two commodities are fairly good substitutes (the elasticity of substitution is
unity in our baseline Cobb-Douglas utility), thus shifting the factors of produc-
tion toward these goods in both countries. The production of monopolistic goods
increases while that of competitive goods shrinks; at the aggregate level both out-
put and especially consumption rise in the home country because the labor supply
increases. The increase in consumption is due to a fall in the real interest rate,
although the nominal interest rate slightly rises, following the jump in expected
inﬂation. In subsequent periods, the anticipated inﬂation eﬀect brings about an
15increase in the real rate, depressing consumption. Investment falls on impact,
and the aggregate capital stock in the following periods declines because of the
assumption that capital is a ﬂexible price good. In our model, price stickiness,
as already pointed out by Ohanian, Stockman, and Kilian (1995), imposes only
an intratemporal distortion without aﬀecting the intertemporal choice between
consumption today and tomorrow, as would be the case if capital were a sticky
price good, as in standard one-sector models with nominal rigidities (e.g., Kim
(1995)).
As we anticipated beforehand, a ﬂoating exchange rate does not perfectly in-
sulate the foreign country from the monetary shock occuring in the home country,
with pricing-to-market and perfect capital mobility (complete asset markets). In-
deed, home demand for the foreign produced monopolistic goods increases too.
This triggers an increase in labor supply in the foreign country in order to meet
world demand, as well as a shift of resources from the competitive to the monop-
olistic sector. The foreign agent has to produce more while consuming roughly
the same: nominal and real interest rates are barely aﬀected. As a consequence,
aggregate consumption displays zero correlation across countries, while as in the
home country, the aggregate level of output rises in the foreign country. The de-
crease in world production of perfectly traded commodities also puts downward
pressure on the foreign relative price of PTM goods, though to a much lesser
e x t e n tt h a ni nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y . F o l l o w i n gt h em o n e t a r ys h o c kb o t ht h er e a l
and nominal exchange rates depreciate. The persistence of these exchange rate
movements closely mimics the persistence of the monetary shock. As a result,
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t er e s p o n s et oam o n e t a r ys h o c kh a sah a l f - l i f eo fo n l ya b o u t
four quarters, signiﬁcantly lower than what is found empirically.
Under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the propagation of the monetary shock is
quite diﬀerent. Since its currency is pegged, the foreign monetary authority has
to increase the rate of money growth following a monetary expansion in the home
country. Thus it imports the home monetary policy and now behaves identically
like the home economy. The responses of all variables in both countries are
generally larger in absolute value under a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, with the
exception of the real exchange rate. This result does not seem to support the
view, ﬁrst spelled out by Mundell (1963), that ﬁxed exchange rates are preferable
(in the sense that output is less volatile) when the source of the shocks is mainly
monetary.9
9In terms of utility, however, the welfare beneﬁto faﬁxed exchange rate system can be quite
diﬀerent.
16Real Shock In contrast to monetary shocks, the transmission of economy-wide,
country-speciﬁc real shocks is practically the same under either a ﬁxed or a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime, as in this case the full insurance mechanism that complete
markets entail is at work. The impulse-responses are presented in Figures 2a
and 2b. Following a positive real aggregate shock in the home country, both
inﬂation rates fall on impact.10 The relative price of monopolistic goods rises in
the two countries as a result of the price-adjustment cost borne by ﬁrms in this
sector. Consequently, the world consumption of PTM goods falls on impact.11
The foreign production of tradable goods falls on impact as the foreign agent
works less (this eﬀect is again due to complete markets) and continues decreasing
as investment (not shown) ﬂows toward the home country. In the aggregate,
consumption in the two countries increases, whereas home output increases and
the foreign output falls. Under ﬂoating exchange rates, both the nominal and the
real exchange rates depreciate on impact following the real shock, although the
magnitude of the depreciations is quite small. The real depreciation is the result
of the increase in the foreign relative price of monopolistic goods relative to the
home one.
It is interesting to note that the ﬁxed exchange rate regime brings about a
decrease in the volatility of the real exchange rate, with all the other variables
reacting in the same way as under a ﬂoat, but for the larger increase in the foreign
production of the monopolistic goods relative to the home one. The necessity of
defending the peg makes the foreign central bank inject money, making up for
the distortion due to sticky prices in the monopolistic sector. This enhances the
eﬀects of the productivity shock.
4.2. Business Cycle Properties
We now turn to the business cycle properties of the model under a ﬁxed and a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime. As we mentioned earlier, Stockman (1983), Mussa
(1986), Baxter and Stockman (1989), and Flood and Rose (1995) ﬁnd that most
variables have approximately the same statistical properties under either Bretton
Woods or the current ﬂoating exchange rate system. The one exception is the real
exchange rate. This ﬁnding is at odds with the received view that the decrease
in the volatility of the real exchange rate brought about by ﬁxed exchange rates
should be reﬂected in increases in the volatilities of other macroeconomic vari-
ables. This section ﬁrst quantiﬁes the eﬀect of a change in exchange rate regime
10For simplicity, we assume the real shocks to be uncorrelated across countries for this exper-
iment.
11The response of tradable consumption is not shown, but it obviously increases.
17on the statistical properties of key macroeconomic variables in the model. Then,
using simulated time series from the model, we compute the statistics reported in
Table 2 of Flood and Rose (1995) to assess the eﬀect on volatilities of the likely
switch to more independent monetary policies following the fall of the Bretton
Woods system. Indeed, we show that the switch to greater policy independence
is capable of explaining the Flood and Rose (1995) result in our setup. We com-
pute all the statistics by logging and ﬁltering the data using the Hodrick and
Prescott ﬁlter and averaging moments across 100 simulations, each running for
a sm a n yp e r i o d sa st h ea c t u a lﬁxed and ﬂoating historical periods (i.e.,5 2a n d
116 quarters respectively).
Table 1. Economic Fluctuations Across Exchange Rate Regimes (in
%) - Average of G7 Countries
Sys. St. Dev.
z e z/$ e/$ π Y C I H
Bretton Woods n.a. 1.90 2.74 2.25 0.70 1.81 1.22 4.10 1.62
Post-Bretton Woods 7.26 7.55 5.01 4.45 0.71 1.82 1.65 4.53 2.23
To give a simple idea of the extent of the puzzle, Table 1 reports the average
standard deviations of inﬂation, ouput, consumption, investment, labor, and ex-
change rates for the G7 countries. We report both the trade-weighted exchange
rates and the exchange rates against the dollar (z/$ and e/$). The table clearly
shows that while the real and the nominal exchange rates became much more
volatile in the post-Bretton Woods era, this has not been the case for the other
macroeconomic variables reported in the table. For instance, the average standard
deviations of output and inﬂation are the same under the two eras. Moreover,
while consumption, investment, and employment have become more volatile, on
average, since 1973, this increased volatility pales compared to the increase in the
standard deviation of the real exchange rate.
Using our simulated data, Table 2 reports the standard deviation of the real
and nominal exchange rates, as well as that of home inflation, output, consump-
tion, investment, and labor. Table 3 describes the volatility of the foreign variables
under the two regimes.
Table 2 shows that the variability of output under a ﬂexible exchange rate
regime is 0.8 percent, roughly one half of the variability of the G7 average output,
while the volatility of aggregate consumption is 40 percent of that in the data,
during the ﬂexible exchange rate period. The standard deviation of investment
is 5.8 times larger than that of output, higher than what it is in the actual
18data. Aggregate output in the foreign country is more volatile than in the home
country, while foreign aggregate consumption is as volatile as in the home country.
Foreign aggregate output is more volatile than home aggregate output because
of the higher standard deviation of the foreign real shock, under our calibration.
Similarly, foreign investment is also more volatile than home investment. Table 3
also shows that the standard deviation of the foreign output is 67 percent of that
in the data.
As we previously mentioned, both real and nominal exchange rates have been
highly volatile under the current ﬂexible exchange rate system. In fact, the stan-
dard deviation of either exchange rate is approximately between two and eight
times that of output, depending on the country and on the exchange rate. Under
our calibration, the model with a ﬂoating exchange rate regime produces vari-
ability of the real and nominal exchange rates that are 1.3 and 3.2 times the
variability of home output, respectively. Therefore, the model succeeds in gener-
ating a volatile nominal exchange rate, yet this does not completely translate into
a very large variability of the real exchange rate relative to aggregate output.
Table 2. Simulated Second Moments of Home Variables (in %)
Sys. St. Dev.
z e π Y C I H
Fix 0.009 n.a 0.86 0.82 0.58 4.69 0.68
(0.0001) 0.002 (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Float 1.02 2.54 0.80 0.80 0.66 4.59 0.65
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Comparing volatilites of variables under either a ﬁx e do raﬂexible exchange
rate regime, Tables 2 and 3 show that the real exchange rate is clearly the variable
most aﬀected by a change in regime. All other variables are barely inﬂuenced by
the change of regime, and none experienced changes in volatility as large as that
of the real exchange rate.
Table 3. Simulated Second Moments of Foreign Variables (in %)
Sys. St. Dev
π Y C I H
Fix 0.86 1.23 0.57 5.87 0.78
(0.002) (0.0063) (0.0019) (0.0059) (0.0025)
Float 0.80 1.21 0.63 5.85 0.73
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0062) (0.0004)
19To gauge the contribution of monetary shocks to this ﬁnding, we computed
the same across-regime volatilities with only real shocks. Tables 4 and 5 show the
results for the home and foreign country, respectively. Now, all the variables are
less volatile than in the case in which both money and real shocks are present.
However, it remains that the variables most aﬀected by the change in the ex-
change rate regime are the nominal and the real exchange rates. Note, also, that
the real exchange rate is now much less volatile than aggregate output. This
suggests monetary shocks play an important role in determining the variabilities
of exchange rates when prices are sticky. This is in stark contrast to results found
in open-economy ﬂexible-price models.
Table 4. Simulated Second Moments of Home Variables (in %) - Only
Real Shocks
Sys. St. Dev.
z e π Y C I H
Fix 0.002 n.a 0.15 0.77 0.25 4.48 0.59
(0.0001) 0.002 (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Float 0.005 0.01 0.16 0.77 0.25 4.48 0.59
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Our ﬁndings are also consistent with ﬁndings in the VAR literature measuring
the eﬀe c t so fm o n e t a r ys h o c k si na no p e ne c o n o m y .B o t hC l a r i d aa n dG a l ì( 1 9 9 4 )
and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), using VAR data representations under very
diﬀerent identifying assumptions, found most of the variability in the exchange
rates to be due to monetary shocks.
Table 5. Simulated Second Moments of Foreign Variables (in %) -
Only Real Shocks
Sys. St. Dev
π Y C I H
Fix 0.15 1.19 0.25 5.74 0.68
(0.002) (0.0063) (0.0019) (0.0059) (0.0025)
Float 0.16 1.19 0.25 5.76 0.68
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0062) (0.0004)
20Finally, in Table 6 we report the impact of the exchange rate arrangement
and of real and monetary shocks on the serial and cross-correlation of selected
variables. The ﬁrst three lines show the serial correlation of the real and nominal
exchange rate and their cross-correlation. In our model, under a ﬂoat, both
exchange rates are less persistent than in the actual data, and monetary shocks
have a dampening impact on their persistence, reﬂecting the fact that monetary
shocks are less autocorrelated than productivity shocks. This points to a weakness
in the propagation mechanism in our model, which we can see clearly from the
above impulse response analysis, which showed that the real exchange rate was as
persistent as the monetary shock. Note also that under the ﬂexible exchange rate
regime, the real and the nominal exchange rates are highly correlated when the
simulations include all the shocks. That correlation, however, falls by more than
a half when only real shocks are included. Again, this points to the importance
of monetary shocks in our framework.
The last four lines of Table 6 show the correlation of the real exchange rate to
the ratio of home and foreign aggregate output, the cross-country correlation of
aggregate consumption, aggregate output, and the nominal money supply. The
ﬁrst statistics is consistent with the data for the case with both real and mone-
tary shocks, as the real exchange rate displays basically no correlation with the
ratio of output (Stockman (1998)). The model’s consumption correlation across
countries decreases going from a ﬁxed to a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. More-
over, that correlation is approximately zero when the exchange rate is allowed to
ﬂoat in the model. This result is due to the presence of monetary shocks. As
could be seen from the impusle response functions, a monetary shock, under a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime, raises home consumption while foreign consump-
tion remains approximately unchanged, while domestic and foreign consumption
move together in response to a real shock. Thus, the presence of monetary shocks
lowers the consumption correlation so much that it is roughly zero under the ﬂex-
ible exchange rate regime. Note, however, that the correlation of domestic and
foreign output is negative in the model. Finally, as expected, the cross-country
correlation of nominal money supply decreases under ﬂoating exchange rates.
21Table 6. Simulated Correlations of Selected Variables
Correlations Shocks
All Shocks Real Shocks
Fix Float Fix Float
ρ(z) 0.79 0.68 0.53 0.65
ρ(e) n.a. 0.73 n.a. 0.69
ρ(z,e) n.a. 0.90 n.a. 0.42
ρ(z,
y
y∗) 0.08 -0.02 0.48 -0.09
ρ(C,C∗) 1 -0.09 1 1
ρ(Y,Y ∗) -0.29 -0.35 -0.40 -0.41
ρ(M,M∗) 1 0.11 1 1
4.2.1. The Flood and Rose (1995) Experiment Revisited
In this section we set out to replicate the main experiment Flood and Rose (1995)
conducted on a panel of eight OECD countries. They start with the observation
that exchange rates are signiﬁcantly more volatile under ﬂexible exchange rate
regimes than under ﬁxed ones. They also ﬁnd that the volatility of other macroe-
conomic variables does not change much across exchange arrangements. As a
result, they argue that models based on fundamentals will likely be unsuccessful
at explaining exchange rates’ movements.
Their experiment is as follows. Take a standard monetary model of exchange
rate determination, ﬁrst assuming perfectly ﬂexible prices. Using a structural
money-market equilibrium condition and PPP, the logarithm of the exchange
rate can be written as:
et =( mt − m∗
t) − β(yt − y∗
t)+α(it − i∗
t) − (εt − ε∗
t) − υt (4.1)
where et is the nominal exchange rate, mt denotes the money stock, yt represents
real income, it is the nominal interest rate, and εt is a money demand shock.
Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk and υt is a stationary random de-
viation from PPP. β and α are structural parameters representing the income
and interest elasticities of money demand, respectively. Denote “traditional fun-
damentals” by relative money stocks and real income across countries:
TF t ≡ (mt − m∗
t) − β(yt − y∗
t). (4.2)
Finally, define as “virtual fundamentals”:
VF t ≡ et − α(it − i∗
t). (4.3)
22Under the assumption of price stickiness, a similar expression relating virtual
and traditional fundamentals can be derived using a Phillips-curve equation:
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where rt i st h ee xa n t er e a li n t e r e s tr a t ew h i l eθ and φ are parameters character-
izing the price-adjustment process. The right-hand side of the equation deﬁnes
the traditional fundamentals under price stickiness:
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As Flood and Rose (1995) stipulate, both traditional and virtual fundamentals
are two diﬀerent ways of measuring the same latent variable. Therefore, we
should expect TF t (TFSt) and VF t to behave similarly provided the model is a
good representation of the data. However, virtual and traditional fundamentals
behave very diﬀerently across exchange rate regimes. Flood and Rose (1995)
show that the volatility of virtual fundamentals is much higher under the Bretton
Woods system than under the current managed float, while that of traditional
fundamentals does not change significantly. To statistically test for a change in
volatility across exchange rate regimes, the authors assume that the change in
traditional and virtual fundamentals, ∆TF t (∆TFSt) and ∆VF t, are normally
distributed, so that the ratio of regime-specific sample variances is distributed as
F under the null hypothesis of equal variance across exchange rate regimes. For
each deﬁnition of fundamentals, Table 7 reports the ratio of the sample standard
deviation under ﬂoating exchange rates relative to the sample standard deviation
under Bretton Woods. In the column labeled “Data,” we compute the statistic
using German and U.S. data. We use data from 1960Q2 to 1972Q4 for the
Bretton Woods era and from 1973Q1 to 1998Q3 for the post-Bretton Woods
era. The table shows that while the null hypothesis of equal standard deviation
across regimes cannot be rejected at the 5 percent conﬁdence level for traditional
fundamentals (with or without price stickiness), this is not the case for virtual
fundamentals.12 The variance of virtual fundamentals increases more than seven
times across regimes.
12The critical values are 1.59 and 1.94 at the 5% and 10% conﬁdence level. In Table 7,
two asterisks indicate that the null hypothesis of equal volatility cannot be rejected at the 5%
conﬁdence level; one aterisk indicates that the hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% but not at
the 1% conﬁdence level.
23Table 7. Volatility Ratios of First Diﬀerenced “Fundamentals” Across
Exchange Rate Regimes
Data All Shocks Real Shocks
VF 3.58 3.24 0.02∗
Flexible-price model
TF 1.19∗∗ 1.31∗∗ 0.94∗∗
Sticky-price model
TFS 1.16∗∗ 1.07∗∗ 0.62∗∗
The second and third columns of Table 7 report the results from the simulated
series of our model under all shocks and only real ones, respectively. As in Flood
and Rose (1995), we set β =1and θ = φ =0 .1.
We ran the following experiment. Simulated data for the model’s analog to the
Bretton Woods period were obtained by constraining the variance of the nominal
exchange rate to be no larger than 1 percent (the typical exchange rate bands
under Bretton Woods) and then endogenously deriving the consistent process for
the foreign growth rate of money.13 Real shocks in both countries and home
money supply shocks were set to their benchmark values. Looking at column 2
for all shocks, the results in Table 7 show that even though the null hypothesis
of equal variance would be rejected in the case of TFS, our equilibrium model
nonetheless gives a very similar picture to that in the actual data. In fact, the
behavior of the volatility of traditional fundamentals across regimes is so close in
our model that the null hypothesis of equal variance would not be rejected in our
simulated data. Moreover, the model captures the increase in the variability in
virtual fundamentals going from a ﬁxed to a ﬂexible exchange rate regime: the
volatility ratio of VF is 3.58 in the data while our model generates a ratio of
3.30. The third column sheds some light on this result: the change of regime is
not able to account for the change in volatility when there are only productivity
shocks, as the ratio of volatility of the virtual fundamentals now falls below one
going from a ﬁxed to a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. As the previous analysis
of the variables’ second moments in the model showed, monetary shocks play an
important role in the dynamics of the model, allowing the model’s implications
to be closer to the data along important dimensions.
13We do this because under a perfect peg the volatility of the virtual fundamentals will be
exactly zero, and therefore, the ratio across regimes will be inﬁnite. In order to introduce some
variability in the nominal exchange rate under the ﬁxed rate regime, we add a shock to the
nominal exchange rate. We calibrate this shock so that the standard deviation of the simulated
VF under the ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei st h es a m ea si nt h ed a t a .
245. Conclusions
In a recent survey Taylor (1995) concludes, summarizing the evidence reported
by Stockman and Baxter (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995), that “this suggests
that there are speculative forces at work in the foreign exchange market which
are not reﬂe c t e di nt h eu s u a lm e n uo fm a c r o e c o n o m i cf u n d a m e n t a l s . ”
In this paper we showed that while this quest may prove fruitful for accounting
for the absolute level of volatility of the exchange rate, a rather standard general
equilibrium model can satisfactorily explain the dramatic increase in the relative
volatility of the nominal and real exchange rates occurring after the demise of
the Bretton Woods system, as well as the relative stability in the volatility of
most other macroeconomic variables. We ﬁnd that using data from a calibrated
version of our model, the real exchange rate is clearly the variable most aﬀected
by a change in exchange rate regime, and we successfully replicated, with data
from our artiﬁcial economy, the Flood and Rose (1995) test.
The natural follow-up to this study is to conduct a rigorous welfare analysis of
diﬀerent exchange rate arrangements. The obvious benchmark against which to
evaluate a peg of the exchange rate is the Ramsey optimal monetary policy and
the implied optimal degree of exchange rate management. Indeed, one argument
in favor of ﬂexible exchange rates is the possibility to pursue an independent
monetary policy for, possibly, short-run stabilization purposes. However, typical
business cycle models introduce money in a way that disregards the use of mon-
etary instruments to achieve such goals. In future work, we plan to pursue these
avenues.
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29Figure 1a: Responses to a Home Monetary Shock
Under a Fixed and a Flexible Exchange Rate
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30Figure 1b: Responses to a Home Monetary Shock
Under a Fixed and a Flexible Exchange Rate
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31Figure 2a: Responses to a Home Real Shock
Under a Fixed and a Flexible Exchange Rate
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32Figure 2b: Responses to a Home Real Shock
Under a Fixed and a Flexible Exchange Rate
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